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Abstract 
At present, more and more private listed companies in our country realize the importance of corporate governance 
structure and equity structure, and also start to adopt a variety of equity incentive models to stimulate the business 
operators. How to evaluate the effect of private listed company's equity incentive measures? By taking the example of 
By-Health, this paper analyzes the effect of implementing equity incentive from financial performance, manager's 
behavior and market performance from three aspects: financial performance, manager's behavior and market 
performance, and puts forward relevant suggestions. With a view to providing useful reference and reference for 
improving the management of private enterprises and implementing equity incentives smoothly. 
Keywords: equity incentive, stock option, By-Health 
1. Introducation 
1.1 Meaning of Equity Incentive 
At present, the governance structure and ownership structure of listed companies are more and more highly valued by 
managers. The management technology is increasingly complex and diverse, and the listed companies also study and 
create a variety of ways and means to effectively motivate managers. Equity incentive is one of the most widely used. 
The incentive of equity is to make the operator of the company, that is, the top management, owns the company's stock 
(the company's ownership) in a variety of ways, making it one of the shareholders of the company. In this way, the 
interests of the operator and the owner of the company become consistent, becoming the relevant interest community, 
and the high-level managers will stand at the angle of the shareholders to operate the company, participate in the 
decision-making and profit distribution of the company. Shareholders can also get excess returns from corporate growth 
so as to achieve mutual win-win. 
1.2 Mode of Equity Incentive 
At present, there are various incentive modes used by the private listed companies in our country, including stock option, 
stock increment right, restrictive stock, virtual equity, deferred payment, management/ employee acquisition, etc. 
However, the equity incentive scheme adopted by listed companies mainly concentrates on the three modes of stock 
option, restrictive stock and stock value added, and the mixed modes. 
1.2.1 Stock options 
Refer to the power that a listed company grants incentive objects to purchase a certain quantity of shares of the 
Company at predetermined prices and conditions within a certain period of time. The predetermined price is referred to 
as the price of the line of sale. If the right price is higher than the company's stock price at the time of sale, the holder 
can give up the price; On the contrary, if it is lower than the stock price of the company, it is possible to buy the shares 
at a lower price, and the difference between the market value and the sales price is the income obtained by the holder. 
For the enterprise owner, the function of the stock option is to bond the enterprise manager with the benefit of the owner 
of the enterprise without paying any cash cost, so as to motivate the enterprise manager to stably provide the enterprise 
value maximization service for the long term. 
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1.2.2 Value-Added Rights of Stocks 
It refers to a right that a listed company grants incentive objects, that is, if the stock price of the company rises, the 
incentive object can get a corresponding quantity of stock price appreciation gains through the stock price. The 
incentive object does not need to pay cash for the depositor, and the company shares the cash or the equivalent of the 
company after the payment. The incentive object of the value-added right of the stock does not actually own shares, nor 
does it have the right to share dividends, the right to vote, and the distribution of shares. 
1.2.3 Restricted Stock 
Refer to a certain amount of shares to be granted by a listed company in advance. If the conditions such as the working 
life, performance or stock market value of the incentive target meet the prior agreement, the restricted stock can be sold 
and the income can be obtained accordingly. Each listed company can design and sell conditions according to the actual 
situation of itself, and has certain flexibility. 
2. Theoretical Foundation and Literature Review 
How to evaluate the effect of equity incentive scheme is that the greater the effect of equity incentive to improve the 
value of an enterprise, the better the implementation effect. Hua Banghua (2002) holds that the higher the contribution 
of the implementation of equity incentive to the improvement of enterprise value, the higher it is. Therefore, the validity 
of equity incentive is that whether the equity incentive can actively promote the value of the enterprise and the interest 
of the owner of the company in a special environment can make the interests of the enterprise manager and the owner 
the same, thus exerting the stimulating effect on the incentive target,  arousing the enthusiasm of his work and weaken 
the existing contradiction between the manager and the owner. The validity of equity incentive can be evaluated in three 
aspects: corporate finance performance, management behavior and market performance. 
2.1 Financial Performance 
The effect of equity incentive is mainly expressed as to whether there is a significant increase in the effect of equity 
incentive before and after the implementation. Most documents use accounting financial indicators to evaluate the 
financial performance of the company's equity incentive, and measure it from aspects such as profitability index, 
management ability index, debt-paying ability index, and long-term index. Wang Qiuxia and Chen Xiaoyi (2009) 
balances the indicators as profitability (net assets return rate, total assets yield), management capacity index (total assets 
turnover, inventory turnover), debt-paying ability index (asset-liability ratio, interest multiple), growth performance 
indicators (main business income growth rate, net assets growth rate) to measure the operating performance of 19 listed 
companies in 2006-2007. Zhao Huawei (2016) uses the performance indicators such as the Tobins’Q value, the total 
assets return rate and the return rate of the net assets to comprehensively inspect the accounting performance of the 
company implementing the executive equity incentive in the investigation period. Chen Yong, Liao Guanmin and Wang 
Ting (2005) adopted three-year average net income change as an index to measure the change of financial performance 
after the implementation of equity incentive. Li Chunling and Ren Lili (2013) not only analyzed the change of 
indicators, but also took the growth rate of main business revenue as an indicator to evaluate the performance. In 
addition, in the financial performance analysis, it is also possible to examine the gold content of the revenue profits 
from the sales collection rate and the net profit. In addition to considering the use of current ratios and quick-moving 
ratios, debt-servicing capacity needs to be combined with the company's development phase, so that further analysis of 
the company's financial position can be considered in view of increased interest guarantees. But it is not enough to 
consider accounting indexes to measure the effect of equity incentive, but also investigate the behavior of managers. 
2.2 Management Behavior 
Management has been able to share the remaining benefits of the company through equity incentives, and the remaining 
benefits of the company's performance growth will enable them to stay active for long periods of time. In order to gain 
equity incentives and share more benefits, managers will redouble their efforts and attach importance to 
decision-making. Management may increase the number of meetings, strengthen the company's internal controls to 
reduce expenses, including sales expenses, administrative expenses, etc. This paper compares the management cost and 
its net profit, as indicated by Wang Jinxiao (2012) in the performance of the equity incentive in the financial statements. 
The effective control of managers contributes to the improvement of performance, and performance promotion is one of 
the criteria to judge whether equity incentives are effective. Through the change of the management cost and the sales 
expense account for the operating income ratio, it can be seen whether the behavior of the manager before and after the 
implementation of the equity incentive effectively controls the cost, so that the effect of the equity incentive can be 
evaluated. But it is far from enough to look at executives from the data of the financial statements. Johnson (1999) 
made a sharp criticism of so many companies adopting absolute value index for performance appraisal. In his opinion, 
such a performance appraisal system has led to a bull run, and the performance of many companies, though less than the 
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average market average, can still get high returns on options. The researchers of Berrand and Mulainathan (2001) also 
supported the idea that their research found that CEO pay levels are easily influenced by their luck, not their ability, and 
when the performance of the entire market and business sector is outstanding, CEO pay is also high. In addition, Healy 
(1985), Dechow and Sloan (1991) pointed out that using only accounting gains as an index of assessment could not only 
be manipulated by executives, but could lead executives to abandon projects that cut short-term corporate profits but 
long-term corporate profits, such as reducing research and development spending. Pan Ying and Liu Guangsheng (2009) 
studied the issue of equity incentive effect by taking stock-stock-driven listed companies as samples in 2004-2007.The 
research found that the stronger the balance force of medium and small shareholders to shareholders, the more obvious 
the effect of equity incentive implementation. Xia Yun (2014) investigated the effect of the Company's executive power 
on R & D investment by using the power to influence the company's executive power from 2002 to 2009.The research 
found that the larger the executive power, the smaller the company's investment. Therefore, from the perspective of the 
long-term development of the enterprise, it is an important aspect to evaluate the implementation effect of the equity 
incentive of listed companies and the behavior of managers. 
2.3 Market Performance 
According to the effective market theory, the stock price reflects the important incentive system of the company, which 
significantly affects the investors' expectation of the future. From the past literature research, most scholars mainly 
employed the excess cumulative yield to describe the market reaction. For example, Huang Hong, Zhang Ming and Liu 
Lin (2014) used the event research method to measure the change of accumulated excess yield to measure the market 
reaction before and after the equity incentive scheme. But different scholars use different lengths in the selection of the 
window period. Zhang Ying and Zheng Xueqing (2008) set the window period to 21 trading days after the event. Qing 
Xue (2016) set the window opening time to 10 days. Lv Changjiang et al. (2009), on the basis of the announcement date 
of the draft equity incentive issued by the resolution of the board of directors, shall be used as the window period for 
one to three days before and after the benchmark date. A shorter event window could eliminate the effects of other 
events on the stock price, but not comprehensive enough. A long window period increases the risk of noise due to the 
common action of other events. 
Therefore, it is important to select a suitable window period. In the past, the analysis of market reaction was too simple, 
it can try to analyze the extent of institutional investors' intervention and the market response after equity incentive. 
Institutional investors have a relatively objective analysis of the sustainability of the company's performance and the 
improvement of corporate governance mechanisms. They tend not to miss the company with investment value. 
Taking the stock ownership incentive scheme of the private listed company of Zhuhai City as an example, this paper 
analyzes the incentive measures of the equity incentive in the By-Health and analyzes the concrete effect of the 
implementation of the equity incentive scheme from three aspects: financial performance, manager behavior and market 
performance, to provide useful reference for improving management of private enterprises and implementing equity 
incentives smoothly. 
3. Analysis on the Equity Incentive Mechanism of By-Health  
3.1 General Situation of By-Health Co., Ltd. 
Established in Oct. 1995 with a registered capital of RMB 1,470 million, By-Health Co., Ltd. introduced the dietary 
supplement into the non-direct marketing area of China in 2002, and quickly developed into the leading brand and 
benchmarking enterprise of Chinese dietary nutrition supplement. It is also the first AAA Chinese health-care enterprise 
in China's health-care industry. In Dec. 2010, the Company was officially listed. It is mainly engaged in R & D, 
production and sales of dietary nutrition supplement. It is a leading enterprise in the non-direct sales field of Chinese 
dietary nutrition supplement industry. It is a high-tech enterprise in the field of biology and new medicine technology. It 
has a professional production base covering many dosage forms such as soft capsule, hard capsule, tablet, powder and 
so on. It has a huge sales network and chain network covering the non-direct sales field of the industry, and has a strong 
channel brand in the industry. It is one of the enterprises with less competition for foreign brands in our national brand. 
The company began to implement the incentive program in 2013, and the first grant of the stock option was divided into 
three periods, and the annual appraisal year was from 2013 to 2015.The performance appraisal is based on the net profit 
of 2012, which is not less than 40%, 82% and 136% respectively from 2013 to 2015;The return rate of net assets in the 
corresponding year is not less than 16%, 18% and 20%, respectively. However, after the issuance of the equity incentive 
scheme, except for the equity incentive payment in 2013 (the net profit of By-Health in 2013 is more than 40% in 2012 
and the annual net assets return rate is not lower than 16%), the equity incentive targets have not been met in 2014 and 
2015. 
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3.2 Driver of Equity Incentive 
The motivation of the implementation of the equity incentive by By-Health Company mainly includes the following 
two aspects: 
Firstly, equity incentive shows the company's confidence, which is conducive to the long-term development. The 
Company issued an equity incentive advertisement to grant 2.33 million shares of stock options to the incentive target, 
accounting for 23.2% of the total share capital of the Company at the time of signing the incentive scheme. The 
incentive targets are senior management personnel, core technology (business) personnel and sub-(son) company's main 
management personnel in the company, with a total of 135.This plan is mainly to motivate senior middle-ranking 
employees of the Company, which is conducive to the long-term development of the Company. 
Secondly, it is committed to promoting brand effect and focusing on endogenous growth.2012 is a very strict year for 
industry regulation, and the whole industry of health care products was affected by “Capsule problem", but the 
company's net profit growth remains 40% to 60%, continuing the momentum of good development in 2011.In 2012, the 
company is committed to the refinement of the terminal. Through the establishment of a nutrition institute, it cultivates 
nutritionist for terminal pharmacies. It established a major clients department, to provide a one-to-one guidance and 
promotion of key terminal customers and distributors and the like, to enhance the brand effect. From the view of the 
extension, the company established 9,000 new terminals in 2012, which is expected to reach 30,000 by the end of 2012. 
There are still larger lifting space from the 6-7 million key terminals of OTC drugs. The future extension expansion will 
be robust. 
The implementation of the incentive scheme of the stock option is to further improve the corporate governance structure, 
promote the establishment of a robust long-term incentive and restraint mechanism, encourage the initiative and 
creativity of the incentive object of the company, to enhance the corporate management team and business backbone to 
realize the responsibility and mission of the company's “healthy, sustained, fast” development, and to ensure the 
long-term development goal of the company. 
3.3 Analysis on the Key Points of the Equity Incentive Scheme of By-Health Co., Ltd 
In 2013, By-Health launched an equity incentive scheme for the first time, as shown in the following table: 










The first exercise period 
63.90 12.96 40% 16% 
The second exercise 
period 
63.90 16.99 82% 18% 
The third exercise period 85.20 20.30 136% 205 
 
Table 2. The arrangement of options and arrangement for the first time in By-Health Co., Ltd. 





The first exercise 
period 
From the first trading day 12 months after the date of 
first authorization to the last trading day within 24 
months after the date of first authorization 
30% 
The second exercise 
period 
From the first trading day of the first authorization day 
24 months later to the last trading day of the last 36 
months from the first authorization day  
30% 
The third exercise 
period 
From the first trading day of 36 months from the first 
authorization day to the last trading day of 48 months 
from the first authorization day 
40% 
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Table 3. Right-exercising Arrangement of Reserve Options of By-Health Co., Ltd. 
Reserved option 
exercise period 
Exercise time Exercise ratio 
The first exercise period 
The first trading day after 12 months from 
the pre-authorization date to the last 
trading day within 24 months from the 
pre-authorization date 
50% 
The second exercise 
period 
The first trading day after 24 months from 
the pre-authorization date to the last 
trading day of 36 months from the 
pre-authorization date 
50% 
3.3.1 Rights-Exercise Conditions 
The achievement goal is an important part of the equity incentive scheme. Only the enterprises that can meet the 
planned target can meet the pre-established goals can they exercise the rights. Generally, the market indicators such as 
ROE, net profit growth rate and other market indicators can be used. The purpose of setting incentive conditions is to 
make the granting of options closely linked to the performance appraisal results of incentive targets. The incentive 
conditions are set up by the company themselves, and the incentive conditions of the incentive programs cannot set up a 
substantive door for the incentive targets, which leads to the failure of the whole equity incentive scheme to achieve the 
real incentive role. From Table 1, you can see that the performance targets set by By-Health are net asset yields and net 
profit growth rates. 
Taking the ROE of the first-phase incentive scheme as an example, we can see from Table 5 that, in 2012, the net assets 
return rate of By-Health Company is only 15.18%, and the annual report of 2013 shows that the return rate of net assets 
is 20.29%, while the return rate of net assets is only 16%.The company raised the benchmark index by 0.82 percentage 
points on the basis of 2012 and continued to increase over the next two years. ROE's performance rose to 20% in 2015 
(benchmark in 2012), which has a great appeal to investors. 
According to Table 4, the net profit growth rate index of the equity incentive scheme of the company is analyzed. Based 
on the net profit 280 million of 2012, the first phase of equity incentive scheme requires the net profit of 2013 to reach 
the 392 million, and the performance index of net profit growth rate based on 82% of net profit in 2014 is RMB 509.6 
million and it realized RMB 660.8 million in 2015.This incentive condition is more incentive to perform under the trend 
of performance growth. 
Table 4. Performance appraisal conditions for the equity incentive scheme of By-Health Co., Ltd. 
Exercise period Performance assessment conditions 
First grant option first exercise 
period 
Based on the net profit in 2012, the net profit in 2013 increased by no less 
than 40% compared with that in 2012, and the return on net assets in that 
year was no less than 16% 
First grant option second exercise 
period / Reserved option first 
exercise period 
Based on 2012 net profit, 2014 net profit increased by no less than 82% 
compared with 2012, and the return rate of net asset was no less than 18% 
First grant option second exercise 
period / Reserved option second 
exercise period 
Based on the net profit in 2012, the net profit in 2015 increased by no less 
than 136% compared with that in 2012, and the return rate of net assets in 
that year was no less than 20% 
3.3.2 Rights Exercise Validity Period 
The first-phase equity incentive scheme of By-Health Company was started in 2013, with a one-year waiting period 
before each equity incentive scheme, so that the duration of the continuous cross-ownership incentive scheme can only 
be completed by 2016, and the equity incentive time is 4 years. Short-term rights exercise will allow executives to have 
incentive to gain high returns in the short term through stock-price manipulation. On the contrary, the long-term 
incentive validity period is likely to give play to the effect of equity incentive. At present, more than 75% of companies 
in our country set the incentive validity period to 5 years and below, which indicates that the threshold value of the 
incentive validity period set by the company is relatively low and presents a new “sheep's effect”. Meanwhile, nearly 25% 
of the company's incentive validity period is less than 5 years, and the motivation of its executive well-being is more 
obvious. 
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3.3.3 Incentive Object 
The first-phase equity incentive scheme is granted to 2.13 million, accounting for 90.1% of the total number of equity 
grants in the plan, accounting for 90.1% of the total share capital of the Company at the time of signing the incentive 
plan; 200000 are reserved, accounting for 8.58% of the total number of stock options granted for this plan, accounting 
for 0.09% of the total share capital of the Company at the time of signing this incentive plan. The incentive targets 
granted for the first time in the Project are senior management personnel in the Company, core technology of the 
Company and key personnel of the business affairs, and sub-(son) main management personnel of the Company. 
By-Health's equity incentive involves a range of key posts from the top to the bottom of the company's control layer. 
3.4 Effectiveness Analysis of Equity Incentive 
3.4.1 Financial Performance Evaluation 
The first phase of the stock ownership incentive scheme of By-Health was achieved in 2013, and no requirement was 
reached in 2014 and 2015. In order to further illustrate the effectiveness of equity incentive, the financial performance 
of the Company is analyzed further. 
In this paper, the financial situation after the implementation of the equity incentive scheme by By-Health Company is 
mainly analyzed from several aspects of short-term debt-paying ability, long-term debt-paying ability, operation ability 
and profitability. The main financial indicators of By-Health Company for 2012-2015 are as follows: 
Table 5. Main financial indicators of By-Health Co., Ltd for 2012-2015 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
Working capital 14.51 16.46 16.67 28.05 
Current ratio 9.54 8.69 7.86 9.37 
Quick ratio 8.30 7.60 6.92 8.45 
Cash ratio 7.40 7.15 6.34 4.30 
Cash flow ratio 0.66 2.93 2.31 1.90 
Asset-liability ratio 8.44% 9.07% 9.37% 7.17% 
Equity ratio 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 
Equity multiplier 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.08 
Debt-to-long capital ratio 0.46% 0.37% 0.41% 0.37% 
Times interest earned -8.30 -13.64 -12.51 -13.44 
Cash flow interest coverage multiple -3.12 -18.23 -12.79 -12.39 
Ratio of net cash flow from 
operating activities to total of 
liabilities 
 
62.35% 281.17% 221.74% 180.40% 
Receivables turnover ratio 36.11 38.49 40.75 47.64 
Inventory turnover ratio 6.60 6.67 7.33 8.44 
Current assets turnover 0.66 0.85 0.90 0.90 
Working capital turnover rate 0.72 0.96 1.03 1.03 
Non-current assets turnover 2.85 2.74 2.45 1.77 
Total assets turnover 0.54 0.65 0.66 0.59 
Operating net profit margin 26.17% 28.51% 29.59% 27.31% 
Total net asset interest rate 14.04% 18.51% 19.50% 16.29% 
Net interest rate 15.18% 20.29% 21.50% 17.71% 
Ratio of cash received from goods and 
services to sales revenue 
1.07 1.15 1.11 1.13 




1.11 6.27 5.61 6.35 
 
Ratio of net operating cash  
flow to net profit 
39.64% 148.58% 111.53% 102.42% 
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3.4.1.1 Analysis of Income and Profit Quality 
The quality of revenue and profits mainly depends on both the growth and the cash content. 
The following figure depicts revenue and earnings growth for 2011-2015. It can be seen that the growth in operating 
revenues is slightly slow after the implementation of the equity incentive scheme in 2013, and the net profit continues to 












Figure 1. Variation trend chart of income and profit index of By-Health Company (Unit:100,000,000 RMB). 
The gold content of the company's revenue is reflected by sales collection rate, which refers to the ratio of the cash 
received to the sales commodity to the operating revenue. It is generally considered that the ratio is more than 1, and the 
gold content of the income is higher. From the data obtained in the company's annual report, the sales collection rate is 
more than 100%, which indicates that the cash content of the company is very high. Since the cash items received by 
the sales commodity are recorded according to the collection and payment, the management's manipulation of income 
can be eliminated to some extent. 
The cash content of profit can be reflected by the net profit rate, i.e. the ratio of net cash flow to net profit. Generally 
speaking, if the net cash flow is positive and the net profit index is close, the profit cash content of the company is 
higher. The cash net flow rate of the operation activities of By-Health company is continuously increasing, and the net 
profit rate is around 100% in 2013, which shows good profit quality. 
3.4.1.2 Analysis of Profitability 
The core profitability of the Company is mainly measured by the rate of return of the net assets. As can be seen from the 
following table, in 2014, the return on net assets of the enterprise presents an upward trend from 15.18% in 2012 to 
20.29% in 2013.At the same time, the net assets of the company rise from 1.93 billion yuan to 2.23 billion, and the 
company realizes higher return rate of net assets at the same time of scale growth, but cannot explain the fruitful work 
of the company's management. 
Table 6. Dupont Analysis Index of the Return on the Net Assets of By-Health 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
Equity multiplier 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.08 
Total assets turnover 0.54 0.65 0.66 0.59 
Net profit margin on sales 
 
26.17% 28.51% 29.59% 27.31% 
ROE 15.18% 20.29% 21.50% 17.71% 
In order to further analyze the change of net assets return rate of the company, the paper uses the DuPont analysis 
method to decompose the return rate of net assets into the product of net interest rate, total asset turnover and equity 
multiplier. As can be seen from the table, there is little change in the net interest rate of the company, which fully shows 
that the competitiveness of the company's products and the company's control of costs have no significant changes. The 
analysis of the above table also reveals that the company's equity multiplier is relatively stable, which indicates that the 
company's operating state is relatively stable, and the management of the company does not increase the use of debt 
financing in the financing structure of the enterprise, and the risk that the company needs to bear is not large. 
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3.4.1.3 Analysis of Financial Position 
By-Health's financial situation is very robust. The following three aspects are as follows: First, the company's 
shareholders' equity is strong, and from the 1.93 billion yuan of 2012 to the 4.55 billion of 2015, good security is 
formed for the debt. The asset-liability ratio of the company is around 9%, the enterprise's capital is abundant, the debt 
service is guaranteed, but also the company's asset utilization rate is not high. Secondly, the company maintains strong 
profitability, and the enterprise obtains profits sufficient to guarantee the payment of interest expenses. From the table, it 
can be seen that the company's interest guarantee multiple is negative and the absolute value is greater than 1, indicating 
that the interest income of the enterprise is greater than 1, that is, the expense does not exist. Without paying the interest 
expense of debt, the enterprise is sufficient to guarantee the payment of interest expenses. Thirdly, the cash content of 
the company's income and profits is high, the cash net flow of the operation activities continues to grow, and also 
constitutes a good repayment guarantee for interest expenses. Fourthly, the current ratio of the company is about 8.8, the 
rate of quick move is about 7.8, indicating that the company's short-term debt-paying ability is strong, although the 
short-term debt-paying ability of the enterprise has sufficient security, due to the large amount of funds occupied, the 
turnover speed of current assets and quick-moving assets is slowed down. The fund cannot give full play to the effective 
use benefit, and then affect the long-term production and management effect of the enterprise. 
3.4.2 Analysis of Management Behavior 
On Jan. 18, 2013, By-Health issued the first equity incentive to the senior management, core technology (business) 
personnel and sub-company (total of 135) of the company to 2.33 million stock options, accounting for 19.6% of the 
total 219 million share of the total share capital of the company at that time. After the issuance of the equity incentive 
plan, the net profit increased by more than 40% in 2012 and not less than 16% in the year of 2014 and 2015, except that 
in 2013, the net profit increased by more than 40% in 2012, and the return rate of the net assets in the current year is not 
less than 16%, and the target is not achieved in 2014 and 2015. So it can be deemed that By-Health's equity incentive 
plan does not achieve its original goals. 
Given that equity incentives, management interests and corporate performance will be closely linked. If equity 
incentives are effective and management's delegated agency issues will be effectively mitigated, management should 
respond and, on the one hand, try to improve the company's performance, increasing the company's revenues or net 
profits, on the other hand, will reduce the costs to achieve sustainable growth in the company. 
This paper mainly uses the absolute numbers and relative numbers of sales expense, total cost and business income to 
analyze the behavior change of managers. Sales expenses refer to the expenses incurred by enterprises in the process of 
selling products, self-made semi-finished products and providing labor services, including packing expenses, 
transportation fees, advertising expenses, loading and unloading fees, insurance premiums, commission charges and 
exhibition fees borne by the enterprises. Rental fees (excluding financing lease fees) and sales service fees etc. The total 
operating cost includes operating cost, business tax, bonus, sales expense, management expense, cash flow, impairment 













Figure 2. Operating income, sales expense and total cost of By-Health Co., Ltd (Unit:100,000,000 RMB) 
From the above figure, we can see clearly that the company's sales expense, total operating cost and absolute value of 
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operating income have always been increasing, indicating that the manager has the corresponding action, and the 
success of the company has gained a great increase in the company's performance. But let's look at the growth of 
relative numbers, and we use the following figure to further illustrate the company's growth. 
 
Figure 3. Sales expenses, total operating cost and business income relative number of By-Health Company 
From the unit revenue sales cost curve, we can see that in the first year of the equity incentive scheme, that is, the unit 
revenue sales cost in 2013 is significantly reduced, down 16% on a year-on-year basis, but the revenue costs for the 
subsequent two years are increasing, The year-on-year rise of 9.5% in 2014 and 17.4% year-on-year in 2015.This shows 
that the managers of By-Health have succeeded through effective marketing method and cost control in the first year of 
the equity incentive scheme, and it also shows that equity incentive is temporary in the first year of the equity incentive 
scheme. However, since 2014, the cost of unit revenue sales in 2014 and 2015 is rapidly rising, reflecting the fact that 
managers have not been able to take effective ways to control unit revenue sales costs since 2014, even though the 
company's operating revenues have increased substantially, However, the cost and the cost can not be well controlled, 
so that the sales cost of the unit revenue is gradually increased, the growth of operating income is at the expense of the 
total operating cost, and the scale economy is not realized. This could partly explain why By-Health's equity incentive 
plan in 2013 was in effect in 2014, but the next two years failed to achieve the goal of failing to reach the target. 
3.4.3 Market Performance Evaluation 
3.4.3.1 Analysis of Abnormal Return 
According to the effective market theory, the market will react to the company's governance in time, and the 
effectiveness of equity incentive scheme significantly affects the investor's expectation of the future. Based on the 
research from previous literature, the paper chooses the cumulative abnormal return to describe the market reaction. In 
this paper, we select [-3, 3], [-5, 5], [-7, 7] as the benchmark time point to calculate the on the basis of the 
announcement time (January 18, 2013) of the draft equity incentive draft published by the board of directors of 
By-Health Company, and select the shorter window period to eliminate the interference of other events. 
Calculation method of cumulative abnormal return: 
a. converting the company's stock price and the big city index into a daily yield (or rate of return): 
Daily stock return = (day price-day before price)/ day before price 
Daily Index Yield = (day index-day before index)/ day before index 
b. Calculate the abnormal return (AR): 
Abnormal Return = Daily Stock Return-Daily Index Return 


















2012 2013 2014 2015
Selling expense/Operating income Total cost/Operating income
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Table 7. Cumulative abnormal return for the time window during the time window of By-Health equity incentive plan 
 CAR [-15, -1] CAR [-5, -1] CAR [--1, 0] CAR [0 3] CAR[-15, 15] CAR [-10, 10] CAR [1, 10] CAR [1, 15] 
Equity incentives 7.94% 4.50% -7.43% -5.26% 7.15% 8.58% 7.96% 6.64% 
As can be seen from the above table, the response was not apparent when By-Health's announcement of the draft equity 
incentive was not apparent, and the excess cumulative yield CAR grew significantly over the previous half of the year 
as compared to the previous day, but was almost flat compared to the previous half-month market. At the same time, it 
was found that the accumulated excess yield had fallen sharply before the announcement date of the equity incentive 
draft, which led to the announcement of the draft, although the cumulative excess yield was increased by about 15%, 
but it was only restored to normal levels. This indicates that the market's recognition of the stock ownership incentive 
scheme is not high. 
3.4.3.2 Institutional Investor Change Analysis 
In the first year of the company's equity incentive program, the performance of the company is prominent, the control 
ability of the company is stronger than that of the previous year, so many fund institutional investors are gaining the 
favor and institutional investors come to invest. From the table, it can be seen from 66 in 2012 to 126 in 2013, up 90.9% 
on a year-on-year basis. But we can see at the same time that rational institutional investors in 2014 have left By-Health, 
and we have said in the previous paper that By-Health is far less than expected in 2014, leading to failures of rights 
exercise. The large-scale departure of institutional investors is also linked to their dislike to By-Health. Although 
institutional investors in 2015 were joining By-Health, the number of institutions rose from 87 to 195, but we couldn't 
ignore the fact that although institutional investors surged, the total number of shares was not high. If only the total 
number of institutional shares is roughly divided into each institutional investor, the average holding capacity of each 
institution is about 32.5 million shares, much less than the average holding capacity of 45.5 million units per institution 
in 2012.It is not easy to find out here that there are a large number of small investors in institutional investors in 2015, 
or that big institutional investors are simply investing in small-scale capital investment by By-Health, explaining that 
most institutional investors are rational investors, Their cautious investments in capital markets, on the other hand, 
illustrate that institutional investors are not very popular with By-Health, at least compared with the base year. 



















2012/12/31 3004.78 — 3004.78 — — 13.74 — 13.74 — — 66 
2013/12/31 7345.48 — 7345.48 — — 22.39 — 22.39 — — 126 
2014/12/31 3987.45 — 1902.17 165.27 1920.02 2.89 — 2.89 0.25 4.99 87 
2015/12/31 6340.73 — 5380.7 271.93 688.11 8.71 — 7.39 0.37 0.95 195 
3.4.3.3 Investment Return Rate Analysis 
By-Health's continuous equity incentives will change investors' expectations about the company's future earnings and be 
reflected on the company's stock price. In this paper, we analyzed the investment return on investment from 2012 to 
2015, taking into account the change of dividend and share price, and compared the return rate of Shenzhen A stock 
market. As shown in the figure below, we found that the market return rate of By-Health Company was much higher 
than that of stock market. The market was excellent, but a sudden drop in 2014 and a negative figure, which rose 
slightly in 2015. 




Figure 4. Comparison of annual return rate and the return rate of Shenzhen A-share 
4. Enlightenment of Case Analysis 
In the light of the specific measures and results of the equity incentive of By-Health Company, we believe that the 
following three points should be paid more attention when implementing the equity incentive scheme: 
Range of incentives. For By-Health, the incentive targets of equity are mainly managers of middle-level managers, core 
technologies (business) and sub-(son) companies of the company, with a total of 135 people, but the highest bidder's 
income is only 80000 shares, and the share of equity is relatively small. In addition, By-Health's equity incentive target 
does not include senior managers such as deputy managers. For an enterprise, executives are the head of the enterprise 
and the implementer of the enterprise plan, so you can think that the incentive targets do not include executives like the 
vice president. The effect of equity incentives may be limited, as the success of equity incentives does not matter for 
such senior managers and does not affect their performance and pay, and naturally it is difficult to mobilize their 
enthusiasm, to achieve the goal of further improving the company's operating performance and promoting the 
company's comprehensive competitiveness. As the beneficiary of the equity incentive scheme of the Company, the 
incentive objects are likely to gain considerable capital gains in the short term, while the remaining gains of the 
Company are enjoyed in the long term, but the short-term earnings are more enticing. The nature of equity incentive can 
be further analyzed from the scope of incentive object. If the incentive range only benefits the directors, management 
and very few employees of the company, equity incentives are likely to benefit executives. Corporate governance as a 
whole is the result of the common role of governance structure and governance environment. The key positions of core 
technical personnel and sales department of the sales department are not stimulated, the incentive is difficult to produce 
effect, and the absence of incentive may result in the dissatisfaction of the employee who should be encouraged. 
Therefore, when implementing equity incentive measures, listed companies must focus on the scope of incentives. If the 
incentive targets do not include some executives, some of the executive's enthusiasm is not high, and the effect of equity 
incentive may be limited; Similarly, if only certain executives are rewarded and other employees are dissatisfied, it is 
also possible to result in an imperfect incentive effect or even a negative effect. 
Rights exercise validity period setting. By the period of one year between the unlocking periods set by the equity 
incentive scheme of By-Health company, many times of unlocking can provide long-term incentive to the enthusiasm of 
the employees, and the long-term validity period can better measure the performance of the employees. The speculators 
should prevent the speculators from cheating on the performance of the performance appraisal for short-term 
performance appraisal. The long-term validity life is a key factor to measure the incentive of equity incentive. In a long 
period of time, management should face performance pressure, each issue is bound by the incentive conditions, and the 
ability of executives to manipulate the performance index during long-term incentive processes is significantly 
weakened. Firstly, performance indicators are likely to be manipulated in a short period of time, and if the deadline is 
long enough, a lot of performance indicators managed through profit management will be reversed, and may be 
manipulated very small. So the effectiveness of equity incentive is obviously higher than that of short-term equity 
incentive. 
Whether the grant of stock option is appropriate. By-Health is proposed to grant a stock option of 3.233 million shares, 
only 19.6% of the total share capital of the company when the incentive plan is signed; From the whole situation of 
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GEM, the proportion of equity incentive granted by most enterprises accounts for about 3% to about 5% of total share 
capital. Such a relatively small number of incentive schemes can make equity incentives less effective because of weak 
incentives, and the fact is that. Therefore, the listed company carries out the equity incentive scheme, the proportion of 
the equity option grant amount accounting for the total share capital is not too low, otherwise the incentive intensity is 
not big, the manager's enthusiasm is not high, the actual effect of the equity incentive can not reach the expectation. 
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